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Discontinuous
Innovation and the Growth Paradox By Soren
Kaplan, Ph.D, Managing Principal, InnovationPoint
(First published in Strategy &
Leadership)
When it comes to innovation and growth,
corporate leadership faces a paradox. On the one hand, visionary
opportunity identification is essential to the long-term growth of
the enterprise. On the other, operational challenges and quarterly
revenue objectives mandate a focus on short-term results. To make
matters worse, the world of emerging "white spaces" is a big place.
How do you even start to identify major growth opportunities?
At Hewlett-Packard, we are finding ways to overcome these
critical issues. HP has a long history of introducing technologies
and products that revolutionize existing industries or create
entirely new markets. Because of this, we have grown-so much that we
are on the verge of breaking into the ranks of the largest 10
companies in America. We are well aware, however, that the compound
annual growth rate of the fastest growing Fortune 10 company is only
about 4 percent. Faced with the "growth stall" that besets the
largest organizations, we are challenged to develop a new model that
will enable a $40+ billion organization to achieve uninterrupted,
profitable, double-digit growth for decades to come. We are
approaching this task by distilling the knowledge that has
contributed to our rich history and developing new business
processes and methodologies that will help us address our most
pressing challenge-how to sustain substantial growth into the
future.
Discontinuous Innovation
Like the pursuit of good health, the
quest for corporate growth is an everlasting and disciplined
exercise. Just as fit individuals must strengthen their bodies
through a multitude of activities-cardiovascular, muscular, dietary,
and others-corporations must pursue well-rounded growth strategies,
from incremental improvements to disruptive breakthroughs that
create new industries and markets.
Although incremental innovations are
critical for protecting revenues through growing market share,
substantial growth over the long horizon requires discontinuous or
disruptive innovation. Michael Tushman and Charles O'Reilly
suggest that discontinuous innovation involves breaking with the
past to create new technologies, processes, and organizational
"S-curves" that result in significant leaps in the value delivered
to customers. Similarly, Clay Christensen, Gary Hamel and C.K.
Prahalad, and James Utterback describe discontinuous innovation as
involving "disruptive technologies," "discontinuities," or "radical
innovations" that permit entire industries and markets to emerge,
transform, or disappear.
Hewlett-Packard's inkjet printer
platform, for example, represents a discontinuous innovation; this
radical technology displaced dotmatrix printing, helped create the
desktop printer industry, and propelled the company into the
leadership position of a multibillion dollar market.
While environmental forces such as
changes in government regulations and social trends can create
white-space opportunities, new technology is often central to what
makes an innovation discontinuous. But scientific breakthroughs are
only a means to an end. The ultimate goal is to create major new
revenue streams and sources of corporate wealth. Contemporary
strategists have given us many examples of organizations that have
created dramatic discontinuities-Sony's Walkman, Chrysler's minivan,
Netscape's Navigator-and their contributions to customer and
shareholder value have been immense.
And yet, while much has been written
about the importance of discontinuous innovation, the corporate
world lacks a systematic framework for identifying promising
discontinuous innovations and creating beyond-incremental growth
opportunities. Building on experiences with strategy formulation,
technology lifecycle analysis, and change management across
Hewlett-Packard (and working with examples from other companies and
industries), this article introduces a model to help business
strategists clarify strategic options for growth.
Opportunity
Identification
Discontinuities are often described as
technological breakthroughs that help companies rewrite industry
rules or create entirely new industries. Rarely have distinctions
been made within the concept of "discontinuity," not to mention how
to identify these radical innovations. For the corporate strategist,
a big question remains: how to actually structure opportunity
identification so it becomes a rational process-one that yields
breakthroughs reliably (versus waiting for opportunities to arise
serendipitously).
We have discovered four types of
discontinuities through our work at HP. As a result, we have
developed a framework to help leaders with discontinuous innovation
opportunity identification-the process of exploring new revenue
streams and identifying compelling propositions for providing
heightened forms of customer value. This is the strategic intent
that defines compelling new business possibilities capable of
driving substantial growth.
The framework takes the perspective of
an organization that wishes to explore opportunities for
discontinuous innovation and is founded upon three assumptions.
First, we believe discontinuous innovation involves creating new
forms of customer value within existing or new markets. Second, by
pursuing discontinuous innovations, organizations create new
competitive space or displace existing methods of delivering value
to customers.
Our final assumption involves the
structure of the model itself. We define four discrete innovation
strategies but suggest that these classifications not be regarded as
mutually exclusive. Instead, these categories should focus efforts
on opportunity identification by providing an understanding of "gray
areas" that all too often cloud the definition of "discontinuity."
The four strategies in our model result from distinct organizational
practices. Such practices are presented as (1) opportunity
identification methods specific to each type of discontinuous
innovation and (2) general approaches applicable to all four
innovation strategies.
Strategy One: Radical
Cannibalism
Radical cannibalism should not be
confused with conventional notions of product cannibalism.
Traditionally, cannibalism suggests an incremental
activity-replacing today's products with next generation
technology-and the competition is usually not far behind in
introducing similar technology and customer value. By contrast,
radical cannibalism involves replacing one's own successful products
or services with fundamentally new technologies or processes,
providing a significant leap in customer value. While some
competitors may be near, most will lack the awareness, expertise, or
resources to compete. Radical cannibalism allows you to
revolutionize the industry by providing a level of customer value
far exceeding what has historically been possible. Not only does
radical cannibalism result in increased market share, the market
size itself may grow due to the heightened value introduced by the
discontinuous innovation.
The lines defining radical cannibalism
shift with the perspective used when exploring opportunities.
Eastman Kodak, for example, is currently engaged in reinventing
itself-shifting its core business from silver halide chemical-based
photography to digital imaging. Kodak must maintain - and even grow
- its core business and primary source of revenue (film) while
transitioning to a digitally focused business. While challenging to
its entire enterprise, if Kodak can move its markets from "Kodak
Gold" to "Kodak digital capture and display," it may remain a leader
within its industry. From the HP perspective, however, the digital
photography market represents an entrepreneurial opportunity to
displace existing competition (for example, through HP's PhotoSmart
digital photography solution). The lines between radical cannibalism
and a competitive displacement strategy change with one's
perspective.
Another example of radical cannibalism
involves Ethicon, a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson and the
leader in traditional medical stitching technology. Ethicon has
identified a potential threat to its core business-Closure Medical
Corporation's Dermabond. A tissue adhesive recently approved by the
FDA, Dermabond has been recognized as a technology likely to replace
stitches as the primary method of suturing wounds. Rather than risk
losing its 80 percent share of the worldwide suture market, Ethicon
has invited Closure Medical into a strategic partnership and plans
to market and promote the startup's revolutionary technology.
There are two methods that can help
reveal opportunities for dramatically elevating the value that can
be delivered to existing markets. And each is rooted in a belief
that "if you don't eat your own lunch, someone else will!"
Hypothesize obsolescence. Considering
the opposite of growth, the scenario of corporate death, can help
reveal new opportunities. Most leaders think about growth in terms
of creation. Exploring competitive strategies, breakthrough
technologies, and customer behaviors that could be detrimental to
the business often reveals unforeseen possibilities. By pondering
the organization's obituary, leadership can achieve insights derived
through suspended assumptions. Silicon Gaming, a new player in the
$15 billion casino gaming industry, for example, has integrated
leading-edge Silicon Valley technology with "Hollywood production
values" to create the next generation in interactive "wagering
devices." Since little innovation (discontinuous or otherwise) has
characterized the long-dormant gaming industry, it appears that
traditional slot-machine competitors have never considered looking
to Silicon Valley, let alone Hollywood, as the source of a new
"Scurve." As a result, long-time industry leaders risk losing market
leadership. If traditional slot machine vendors had hypothesized
obsolescence when "multimedia" first emerged, Silicon Gaming might
not represent the significant threat that it does today Scan
startups.
Small-cap companies represent the seeds
of industry reinvention. When major players spot high potential
upstarts, mutually beneficial strategic partnerships can be created.
We have seen how Johnson & Johnson's Ethicon has applied this
principle in its alliance with Closure Medical in the suture market.
Similarly, the computer mass-storage industry may be about to
experience a similar upheaval-little known Silicon Valley TeraStor
is about to introduce its Near Field Recording technology which will
enable one side of a single CD-sized disk to hold up to 20 gigabytes
of updatable data. Even though TeraStor's breakthrough device
represents a significant threat to traditional mass-storage
media-including tape, magneto-optical, removable hard disks, and so
forth-Imation (3M's recent spin-off) has become a key strategic
partner in enabling TeraStor to enter the market. Both companies
will reap the benefits if Near Field Recording succeeds.
Strategy Two:
Competitive Displacement
Competitive displacement resembles
radical cannibalism, but instead of displacing your own products and
technologies, you displace those of your competitors. Competitive
displacement strategies involve applying existing competencies to
new industries and markets, displacing the traditional competition
in the process. This strategy is especially powerful, primarily
because your competitors do not consider you the competition until
you have entered their market. Because your disruptive innovation
targets a market unrelated to your current business, you can
blindside industry incumbents by providing their customers with a
surprising, creative, more effective mechanism for creating value.
Although startups (companies like
Silicon Gaming or Closure Medical) are well-positioned to introduce
disruptive innovations, well-established organizations that
creatively explore applications and markets beyond their
conventional business boundaries can enter new industries and
markets through competitive displacement strategies. Several years
ago, GM's Hughes Electronics introduced DirectTV, a digital
satellite system that transmits television and movies directly to
the home. Since traditional cable television operators did not see
either of these companies as a threat, DirectTV was an unparalleled
and, at first, unchallenged discontinuous innovation in the cable
television industry.
Hewlett-Packard is currently pursuing a
competitive displacement opportunity related to digital photography
HP's PhotoSmart product line-which integrates a digital camera,
scanner, photo-quality printer (using special paper and inks), and
image editing and management software represents an attempt to
displace traditional players in the world of photography. Unlike
Kodak, HP sees the shifting technology as a window of opportunity
for unbridled growth rather than a painful and necessary phase of
"industry evolution."
The following methods can be used to
generate opportunities for moving beyond today's business
opportunities to provide higher levels of value in new competitive
arenas.
Elevate your business charter.
Successful opportunity identification relies on the assumptions we
make in defining the boundaries of strategy. Who would have expected
HP to enter the photography or photocopier markets? For a company in
the "communications business," however, these markets are logical
extensions. By elevating the charter of the business, it becomes
possible to see a broader competitive landscape. Hallmark, for
example, defines itself as being in "the social expression
business." By broadening strategic boundaries, Hallmark sanctions
business development beyond the narrow focus of greeting cards.
Explore tangential industries. Few
companies scan industry trends or talk to "customers" that have no
obvious relationship to their immediate business. Why should they?
Industry exploration requires a qualitative approach to
understanding how core technologies can provide breakthrough
customer value in industries outside your own. One of the world's
leading materials companies, for example, with a strong competence
in films and adhesives, recently explored "things that need to be
put and stuck together" across numerous industries. One area of
focus was the automotive industry, where the biggest problem is
paint-rippling, chipping, and scratching. With a competency in
"adhering things together," the company saw an opportunity to
displace traditional automotive painting systems with sheets of
color adhesive film, a new technology being developed
today.
Strategy Three: Market
Invention
Market invention is probably the most
common approach to corporate growth. With some modification of
technology and a great deal of creative market research, new
applications form the basis for new ventures that provide customer
value within an existing industry. This approach does not usually
require cannibalistic behavior or the implementation of radically
new technologies. Rather, market invention leverages what the
organization already does well through logical extensions that touch
customers in today's markets.
Mattel is a master of market invention.
One of the world's largest toy manufacturers, the company has grown
sevenfold in the last 14 years. Its core business strategy-to build
its brands (Barbie, Hot Wheels, Fisher-Price*relies heavily on
market invention. Mattel president Jill Barad recently commented
that market invention enables Mattel to avoid the organizational
complications associated with cannibalization while creating new
distribution channels for new markets. For example, Mattel recently
extended the Barbie doll (its most profitable "technology") into the
collector's market. Serious collectors can now purchase high end
Barbies for about $300 each. Another example from the same company
is Mattel Media, which introduced a line of Barbie-branded software
for girls in 1996. One of its programs, Barbie Fashion Designer
(which allows young children to create Barbie clothing using
computers and printers), set a new, one-month, CD-ROM sales record.
Other examples of market invention
include Chrysler's minivan and the Gap's Old Navy brand. The minivan
is a classic example of the market invention strategy; it created a
new category in transportation, brought the company back from the
brink of bankruptcy, and remains a major source of income for
Chrysler today. Similarly, the Gap recently produced its Old Navy
brand, a high-quality, trendy, yet low-cost warehouse outlet for the
lower-end clothing market.
We have discovered two primary methods
for exploring market invention opportunities. Both focus on
leveraging existing technology and competence to create new markets
for the organization.
Expand customer boundaries. When Mattel
decided to sell dolls to adults, it created a $175 million Barbie
collector business. When the Gap decided to sell fashionable clothes
to the low-end market, it created Old Navy. Many companies become
mired in their definition of "the customer." By considering the
entire world as a potential market and working backward from there,
companies can identify opportunities for discontinuous innovation.
It is important to define "distribution" broadly, by considering a
broad range of physical value chains as well as the medium of
delivering value. (Delivering fashions for dolls via CD-ROMs and
printers is a truly discontinuous concept.) If we begin with the
assumption that everyone is a potential customer, the search becomes
that of prioritizing promising markets and value chains, not
conceptualizing them from scratch.
Identify systems. When Microsoft Office
was introduced, the company created a single product that addressed
the spectrum of customer needs-word processing, database management,
spreadsheet calculations, and presentations. Microsoft extended its
value to a portfolio of integrated products that met needs rooted in
the "office system." HP's PhotoSmart product line involves a similar
approach but focuses on providing the consumer photographer with an
entire digital imaging solution. By understanding the context in
which customers use a combination of disparate products, it is
possible to integrate value with more compelling offerings that meet
a greater number of customer needs.
Strategy Four:
Industry Genesis
Industry genesis results from the
introduction of new-to-the-world technology and customer value.
Historically, industry genesis has been the umbrella under which
consultants, managers, and academics have described the impact of
discontinuous innovation. Industry genesis is also the most
challenging discontinuous innovation strategy-most are never able to
do it. Here we see the reasons why "discontinuity" has remained a
theoretical rather than practical option for corporate strategists.
Cellular phones, microwave ovens, air
conditioners, and scientific calculators are all industry-spawning
innovations. In some instances, industry genesis may resemble
competitive displacement, since one consequence of this approach may
be displaced technology, although the ultimate impact is broader.
(The first scientific calculator led to the obsolescence of the
slide rule while creating a new industry and transforming many
others.)
Industry genesis is distinct in three
ways. First, since the strategy involves industry creation, direct
competition does not necessarily exist. The breakthrough technology
not only results in new forms of customer value but concurrently
creates a new competitive set-a completely new population of
competitors focused on replicating and incrementally enhancing the
customer value that was introduced. With industry genesis, one can
only guess who future competitors may be. Second, markets are not
entirely definable (at least initially). They must be developed
through a new-to-the-world value proposition. And third,
industry-creating discontinuous innovations open windows of
opportunity for organizations in tangential industries. (For
example, the microwave spawned significant opportunities in both the
food and packaging industries.)
Hewlett-Packard has a history of
industry genesis. The HP35 represented the world's first hand-held
scientific calculator and was the first product to combine both
integrated circuits and LEDs. Though market research conducted by
the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) suggested the product would
fail because of its small size, this innovation ultimately created
the calculator industry. And in 1984, HP introduced the LaserJet,
the first desktop laser printer. The LaserJet created the desktop
printing and publishing industries while subsequently contributing
to the obsolescence of typewriters. The technology also created
major opportunities for companies like Avery Dennison (now the
leader in LaserJet-friendly labels) and Adobe (currently the leader
in desktop publishing software).
As with many technologies that create
industries, it is extremely difficult to estimate the size of the
market, let alone how the innovation will be received. As a
strategic alternative, industry genesis carries the highest
uncertainty and risk. Following are two strategies that underlie
many industry-creating discontinuous innovations.
Miniaturize. The HP35 was created by HP
engineers in response to a personal challenge from Bill Hewlett.
Hewlett had asked for a "desktop computer" that would fit into his
shirt pocket. Tappan introduced the first microwave oven in 1952.
Ten years later, the appliance was as expensive as a new car and
required wall installation. Needless to say, miniaturization
eventually created the consumer microwave industry Sony mastered the
intricacies of miniaturization and invented the Walkman. By
considering any technology and exploring diverse applications that
would be enabled by miniaturization, one can identify
new-to-the-world value propositions for new-to-the-world markets.
Miniaturization opportunities often arise from asking "what if"
questions about technologies that have not been widely applied
because of size and cost.
Combine functionality. The integration
of seemingly disparate technologies or functions can create new
forms of customer value. Two interesting examples come from the
world of sports-rollerblades (which combine ice and roller skates)
and snowboards (which combine skis and surf boards). Other, more
high-tech examples include the first scientific calculator (which
combined integrated circuits and LEDs), edutainment software (which
combines interactive entertainment with educational material), and
electronic personal organizers (which combine computers and
calculators with pocket calendars and organizers). Integrating
functionality means creating new methods of meeting combinations of
customer needs, which when satisfied together result in major new
business opportunities.
Managing the Paradox
When tested through market research,
the HP35 calculator, the first videocassette recorder, the fax
machine, and Federal Express all received negative ratings! In many
companies, leadership would have killed these new business concepts,
and in most, leadership would not have made time to identify such
opportunities in the first place. Even when breakthrough ideas do
survive, broadbased resistance to new technologies and business
strategies that represent substantial change may impede migration to
the next organizational S-curve. What can be done to manage the
organizational challenges associated with discontinuous innovation?
The literature is full of insightful
suggestions for fostering and managing discontinuous innovation,
including creating "ambidextrous organizations" (Tushman, 1997),
engaging in "discovery-driven planning" (McGrath and MacMillan,
1995), and "probing and learning" (Lynn, Morone, and Paulson, 1996).
Above all, leadership must establish an environment conducive to
discontinuous innovation-through internalizing and then
communicating the qualitative differences between conventional,
analytical, strategy formulation and the search for breakthroughs.
While traditional strategy formulation
focuses on reducing uncertainty, discontinuous innovation requires
viewing uncertainty as opportunity. Quantification and projection
will always have their place, but discontinuous innovation
flourishes through qualitative speculation and trial and error. For
example, conventional wisdom suggests that market research and
quantified projections indicate the viability of an innovation. With
discontinuous innovation, however, market research acts as a
catalyst for developing and enhancing new ideas. After all,
customers seldom articulate needs they don't know they have. Ten
years ago, how many people would have asked for a subscription to
anything like America Online? Thirty years ago, how many people
would have asked for a calculator that fits into a shirt pocket-or a
microwave, or a VCR, or a Walkman?
Market and customer research are
needed, of course, but the purpose of gathering such data differs
when seeking discontinuities. The reason why customers cannot always
articulate their needs is that they rarely understand what is
possible. To underscore this critical point at HP, we emphasize the
importance of achieving "an imaginative understanding of customer
needs" when seeking discontinuities. This motto helps market
research become a means for exploring, refining, and validating
ideas, rather than serving as a "go/no-go" decision-making tool.
Most reward systems provide incentives
for execution (flawlessly achieving short-term objectives), but
discontinuous innovation is necessarily a long-term investment
characterized by sporadic failures-it took HP about 10 years to
develop and successfully introduce the laser printer. Identifying a
potential discontinuous innovation (not to mention moving the
concept through development and delivery) takes time. Sometimes you
have to work diligently on the large scale until the feasibility of
miniaturization emerges. Other times you have to assemble and
motivate various organizational stakeholders to integrate
technologies. And because the innovation usually represents
something new for the organization, trial and error are almost
always necessary. Because discontinuous innovations may take years
to identify, develop, and introduce, formal reward systems must
leave room for sanctioned discontinuous innovation processes that
include the acceptance of failure.
Conventional forecasting assumes that
industry evolution and growth are linear. By contrast, discontinuous
innovation management presupposes a lifecycle perspective. Infusing
a new common sense into organizational culture-one that suggests
that technologies and organizations are born, grow, decline, and are
born again-can create a climate that supports portfolio
management.
Sustained growth requires creation and
re-creation by leadership and by the organization as a whole. To
understand that a technology-and the company whose future success
depends on it-will eventually face the end of its lifecycle inspires
urgency for, and commitment to, discontinuous innovation. When the
organization views success as transient, and long-term growth is
contingent on creating the next S-curve, discontinuous innovation
becomes a collective imperative
References
Christensen, Clayton M.
The Innovator's Dilemma: When Disruptive Technologies Cause Great
Firms to Fail. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1997.
Hamel, Gary, and C. K.
Prahalad. Competing for the Future. Boston: Harvard Business School
Press, 1994.
Lynn, Gary S., Joseph
G. Morone, and Albert S. Paulson. "Marketing and Discontinuous
Innovation: The Probe and Learn Process." California Management
Review, 1996.
McGrath, Rita Gunther,
and Ian C. MacMillan. "Discovery-driven Planning." Harvard Business
Review, July 1995.
Tushman, Michael L.
"Winning Through Innovation." Strategy & Leadership, July/August
1997.
Tushman, Michael L.,
and Charles A. O'Reilly, III. Winning Through Innovation. Boston:
Harvard Business School Press, 1997.
Utterback, James M.
Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation. Boston: Harvard Business
School Press, 1996.
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